Aggregating time preferences with decreasing impatience by Anchugina, Nina et al.
Aggregating time preferences with decreasing
impatience∗
Nina Anchugina1, Matthew Ryan2, and Arkadii Slinko1
1Department of Mathematics, University of Auckland
2School of Economics, Auckland University of Technology
n.anchugina@auckland.ac.nz, matthew.ryan@aut.ac.nz, a.slinko@auckland.ac.nz
April 2016
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1 Introduction
Sometimes decisions about timed outcomes have to be made by a group of individuals,
such as boards, committees or households. It is natural to think that individuals may differ
in the discounting procedure that they use. If the decision is to be made by a group of
individuals it is desirable to have an aggregating procedure that suitably reflects the time
preferences of all members. The natural option is to average the discount functions across
individuals, which is equivalent to averaging the discounted utilities in the case when all
agents have identical utility functions. This approach has been widely used in the existing
literature on time preferences. It is known that such collective discount functions need not
share properties that are common to the individual discount functions being aggregated.
As Jackson and Yariv demonstrate [11], if individuals discount the future exponentially
and there is a heterogeneity in discount factors, then their aggregate discount function
exhibits present bias, which means that delaying two different dated-outcomes by the
same amount of time can reverse the ranking of these outcomes. Moreover, when the
number of individuals grows, in the limit the group discount function becomes hyperbolic
[11].
Jackson and Yariv [11] give the following example of present-biased group preferences
for a household with two time-consistent individuals, Constantine and Patience. Both
have identical instantaneous utility functions, and discount the future exponentially, but
Constantine has a discount factor of 0.5, whereas Patience has a discount factor of 0.8.
Suppose that they need to choose between 10 utiles for each today or 15 utiles for each
tomorrow. They calculate the aggregate discounted utility for each option: 10 + 10 = 20
and 15(0.8 + 0.5) = 19.5. Therefore, 10 utiles today is chosen. Now suppose that they
must choose between 10 utiles at time t ≥ 1 and 15 utiles at t + 1. The aggregate
discounted utilities in this case are 10(0.8t + 0.5t) and 15(0.8t+1 + 0.5t+1), respectively.
For any t ≥ 1 the 15 utiles at t + 1 is preferable to the 10 utiles at t, which reverses
the initial preference for 10 utiles at t = 0 over 15 utiles at t = 1. The behaviour of the
household is present-biased.
Another scenario in which the aggregation of time preferences may be required is when
a single decision maker is uncertain about the appropriate discount function to apply.
For example, discounting may be affected by a survival function with a constant but
uncertain hazard rate. Such scenarios are considered by Weitzman [27] and Sozou [24]. If
the decision-maker maximizes expected discounted utility, then she maximizes discounted
utility for a certainty equivalent discount function, calculated as the probability-weighted
average of the different possible discount functions that may apply. Weitzman [27] shows
that if each of the possible rates of time preference converges to some non-negative value
(as time goes to infinity), then the certainty equivalent time preference function converges
to the lowest of these limits. Similarly, Sozou [24] considers a decision maker whose
discounting reflects a survival function with a constant, but uncertain, hazard rate. If this
hazard rate is exponentially distributed, Sozou shows that the decision-maker’s expected
discount function is hyperbolic.
Of course, present bias is not limited to aggregate or expected discount functions. It
is often observed in experiments that individual decision makers become decreasingly im-
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patient (increasingly patient) as rewards are shifted further into the future. If a decision-
maker is indifferent between an early outcome and a larger, later outcome, then delaying
both outcomes by the same amount of time will often result in the larger, later outcome
being preferred. Such subjects exhibit present bias, or strictly decreasing impatience
(DI). Exponential discounting implies constant impatience, so it cannot explain strictly
decreasing impatience, either globally or locally. The necessity of accommodating DI in in-
dividual time preference has made hyperbolic discounting a significant tool in behavioural
economics. Several types of hyperbolic discount functions have been introduced, including
quasi-hyperbolic discounting [17, 14], discounting for delay [1], proportional hyperbolic
discounting [10, 16], and generalized hyperbolic discounting [15, 2]. Given the widespread
use of hyperbolic discount functions to describe individual time preferences, it is important
to understand the behaviour of aggregated, or averaged, hyperbolic functions.
The goal of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we seek to extend Jackson and Yariv’s
result on the aggregation of exponential discount functions. Two individuals may differ
in the rate at which their impatience decreases, but their respective levels of DI may
be comparable – the preferences of the one may exhibit unambiguously more DI than
the preferences of the other. As Prelec [19] proved, one individual exhibits more DI than
another if the logarithm of the discount function of the former is more convex than that of
the latter. Can we say anything about the level of DI of the weighted average of individual
discount functions that can be (weakly) ordered by DI? Theorem 1 establishes that the
weighted average always exhibits strictly more DI than the component with the least DI.
This generalizes Jackson and Yariv’s result. Proposition 1 in [11] shows that the weighted
average of exponential discount functions with different discount factors exhibits present
bias. We show that when preferences satisfy the axioms of Fishburn and Rubinstein
[7], Jackson and Yariv’s definition of present bias is equivalent to strictly decreasing
impatience. Since all exponential discount functions exhibit constant impatience – they
all exhibit the same degree of DI – Proposition 1 of Jackson and Yariv is a special case
of our Theorem 1.
Our second goal is to prove an analogue of Weitzman’s [27] result: one in which
discounting is hyperbolic but there is an uncertainty about the hyperbolic discount factor.
The answer, given in Theorem 3, is very different to Weitzman’s answer for the case of
exponential discounting. We show that the certainty equivalent hyperbolic discount factor
converges, not to the lowest individual hyperbolic discount factor, but to the probability-
weighted harmonic mean of the individual hyperbolic discount factors.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the framework for our investigation and define the two key
concepts used in this paper: present bias and strictly decreasing impatience of preferences.
We prove that these two concepts coincide when the Fishburn-Rubinstein axioms for a
discounted utility representation are satisfied. Taking our lead from Pratt [18] and Arrow
[3], these concepts are discussed in terms of log-convexity of discount functions, hence we
introduce necessary results and definitions in this regard. Most results are known but
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included to keep the paper self-contained.
2.1 Convexity and log-convexity
Convexity and log-convexity play an important role in the theory of discounting. Let
I be an interval (finite or infinite) of real numbers. A function f : I → R is convex if for
any two points x, y ∈ I and any λ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that:
f (λx+ (1− λ) y) ≤ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y).
A function f is strictly convex if
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) < λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y)
for any x, y ∈ I such that x 6= y and any λ ∈ (0, 1). If f is twice differentiable convexity
is equivalent to f ′′ ≥ 0, and strict convexity is equivalent to two conditions: the function
f ′′ is nonnegative on I and the set {x ∈ I f ′′(x) = 0} contains no non-trivial interval
[25].
The following equivalent definition of a (strictly) convex function is well known. A
function f : I → R is (strictly) convex if for every x, y, v, z ∈ I such that x−y = v−z > 0
and y > z we have
f(x)− f(y) ≤ [<]f(v)− f(z).
Convexity is preserved under composition of functions, as shown in the following
lemma, whose straightforward proof is omitted:
Lemma 1. Let f1 : I → R be a non-decreasing and convex function and f2 : I → R be
a convex function, such that the range of f2 is contained in the domain of f1. Then the
composition f = f1 ◦ f2 is a convex function. If, in addition, f1 is strictly increasing, and
either f1 or f2 is strictly convex, then f is also strictly convex.
A function f : I → R is called log-convex if f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ I and ln(f) is
convex. It is called strictly log-convex if ln(f) is strictly convex. If follows that if f is
a (strictly positive) twice differentiable function, then log-convexity of f is equivalent to
the condition f ′′f − (f ′)2 ≥ 0, while strict log-convexity of f requires, in addition, that
the set
{ x ∈ I f ′′(x)f(x)− [f ′(x)]2 = 0 }
contains no non-trivial interval. Log-convexity can also be expressed without using loga-
rithms [5]. A function f : I → R is log-convex if and only if f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ I and
for all x, y ∈ I and λ ∈ [0, 1] we have:
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ f(x)λf(y)1−λ. (1)
The function f is strictly log-convex if inequality (1) is strict when x 6= y and λ ∈ (0, 1).
The following result appears to be well known, but a formal reference is elusive so we
have included a proof here for completeness.
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Lemma 2. Let f, g : I → R be functions with f strictly log-convex and g log-convex. Then
the sum f + g is strictly log-convex.
Proof. Since f(x) > 0 and g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ I, we have (f + g)(x) > 0 for all x ∈ I.
Let x, y ∈ I such that x 6= y and let λ ∈ (0, 1). We must show that
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) + g(λx+ (1− λ)y) < (f(x) + g(x))λ(f(y) + g(y))1−λ.
Since f is strictly log-convex, we have
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) < f(x)λf(y)1−λ. (2)
Analogously, since g(x) is log-convex:
g(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ g(x)λg(y)1−λ. (3)
Summing (2) and (3) we obtain:
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) + g(λx+ (1− λ)y) < f(x)λf(y)1−λ + g(x)λg(y)1−λ.
Denote a = f(x), b = f(y), c = g(x), d = g(y). Note that a, b, c, d > 0. To prove the claim
of the lemma, it is sufficient to show that:
aλb1−λ + cλd1−λ ≤ (a+ c)λ(b+ d)1−λ. (4)
Since (a+ c)λ(b+ d)1−λ > 0 we can divide both parts of (4) by this expression to get(
a
a+ c
)λ(
b
b+ d
)1−λ
+
(
c
a+ c
)λ(
d
b+ d
)1−λ
≤ 1.
By the Weighted AM-GM inequality [6, Theorem 7.6, p. 74]:(
a
a+ c
)λ(
b
b+ d
)1−λ
≤ λ a
a+ c
+ (1− λ) b
b+ d
and (
c
a+ c
)λ(
d
b+ d
)1−λ
≤ λ c
a+ c
+ (1− λ) d
b+ d
.
Hence, (
a
a+ c
)λ(
b
b+ d
)1−λ
+
(
c
a+ c
)λ(
d
b+ d
)1−λ
≤ λ+ (1− λ) = 1,
which proves the statement in the lemma.
One of the important definitions which will be frequently used throughout the paper
is that of a convex transformation. We say that f1 is a (strictly) convex transformation of
f2 if there exists a (strictly) convex function f such that f1(x) = (f ◦ f2)(x) = f(f2(x)).
Lemma 3. Let f1, f2 : I → R such that f−12 exists. Then f1 is a (strictly) convex trans-
formation of f2 if and only if the composition f1 ◦ f−12 is (strictly) convex.
Proof. See [18].
Recall also that a function f : I → R is called concave if and only if −f is convex.
Thus a function f : I → R is log-concave if and only if 1/f is log-convex. Therefore, the
definitions and results stated in this section can be easily adapted for (log-)concavity.
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2.2 Preferences
Let X ⊂ R+ be the set of outcomes. We will assume that X is an interval of non-
negative real numbers containing 0. The natural interpretation is that outcomes are
monetary (for an infinitely divisible currency) but this is not essential. Let T = [0,∞)
be a set of points in time where 0 corresponds to the present moment. The Cartesian
product X×T will be identified with the set of timed outcomes, i.e., a pair (x, t) ∈ X×T
is understood as a dated outcome, when a decision-maker receives x at time t and nothing
at all other time periods in T \ t.
Suppose that a decision-maker has a preference order < on the set of timed outcomes
with  expressing strict preference and ∼ indifference. We say that a utility function
U : X × T → R represents the preference order <, if for all x, y ∈ X and all t, s ∈ T
we have (x, t) < (y, s) if and only if U(x, t) ≥ U(y, s). This is a discounted utility (DU)
representation if
U(x, t) = D(t)u(x), (5)
where u : X → R is a continuous and strictly increasing function with u(0) = 0, and
D : T → (0, 1] is continuous and strictly decreasing such that D(0) = 1 and lim
t→∞
D(t) = 0.
The function u is called the instantaneous utility function, and D is called the discount
function associated with <. We say that the pair (u,D) provides a discounted utility
representation for <. Fishburn and Rubinstein [7] provide an axiomatic foundation for
a discounted utility representation. A list of their axioms is given in the Appendix. We
assume that < has a discounted utility representation throughout the paper.
As D is strictly decreasing, our decision maker is always impatient. However, as time
goes by, her impatience may increase or decrease.
Definition 1 ([19]). The preference order < exhibits (strictly) decreasing impatience (DI)
if for all σ > 0, all 0 ≤ t < s and all outcomes y > x > 0, the equivalence (x, t) ∼ (y, s)
implies (x, t+ σ) 4 [≺] (y, s+ σ).
Increasing impatience (II) can be defined by reversing the final preference ranking in
Definition 1. However, we focus on DI preferences in the present paper, since this appears
to be the empirically relevant case. As in the previous sentence, we also use the acronym
“DI” interchangeably as a noun (“decreasing impatience”) and an adjective (“decreasingly
impatient”), relying on context to indicate the intended meaning.
In case the preference order < has a discounted utility representation, the characteri-
zation of DI in terms of the discount function is well-known.1
Proposition 4 ([10, 19]). Let < be a preference order having discounted utility represen-
tation with the discount function D. The following conditions are equivalent:
• The preference order < exhibits (strictly) DI ;
• D is (strictly) log-convex on [0,∞).
1The proof in [10, Theorem 3.3] can be easily adapted to demonstrate an analogous result for increasing
impatience: the preference order < exhibits (strictly) II if and only if D is (strictly) log-concave on [0,∞).
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We say that discount function D is (strictly) DI if the preference order < exhibits
(strictly) DI and has a discounted utility representation with discount function D.
We next show that a preference order < with a discounted utility representation ex-
hibits strictly DI if and only if it exhibits present bias in the sense of Jackson and Yariv
[11, p. 4190]. It is important to note, however, that Jackson and Yariv assume a dis-
crete time setting, whereas we allow time to be continuous. The following Definition 2 is,
therefore, the continuous-time analogue of their present bias definition.2
Definition 2 (Present Bias). The preference order is present-biased if
(i) (x, t) 4 (y, s) implies (x, t + σ) 4 (y, s + σ) for every x, y, every σ > 0 and every
s, t ∈ T such that s > t ≥ 0; and
(ii) for every s, t ∈ T with s > t ≥ 0 and every σ > 0 there exist x∗ and y∗ such that
(x∗, t+ σ) ≺ (y∗, s+ σ) and (x∗, t)  (y∗, s).
Proposition 5 gives conditions which are equivalent to present bias for preferences with
a discounted utility representation:
Proposition 5. Suppose that < has a discounted utility representation. Then the first
condition of Definition 2 is equivalent to convexity of lnD(t); while the second condition
of Definition 2 is equivalent to strict convexity of lnD(t).
Proof. We start by proving the first equivalence. Since a discounted utility representation
exists, the first condition is equivalent to:
u(x)D(t) ≤ u(y)D(s) implies u(x)D(t+ σ) ≤ u(y)D(s+ σ)
for every x, y, every σ > 0 and every s, t ∈ T with s > t ≥ 0. This may be rewritten as
follows:
u(x) ≤ D(s)
D(t)
u(y) implies u(x) ≤ D(s+ σ)
D(t+ σ)
u(y).
Since (y, s) < (x, t), s > t and D is strictly decreasing it follows that u(y) > u(x). As
u(0) = 0 and u is strictly increasing we deduce that u(y) > 0. Since u is continuous, x
and y can be chosen so that u(x)/u(y) takes any value in [0, 1). We therefore have:
D(s)
D(t)
≤ D(s+ σ)
D(t+ σ)
.
Alternatively,
lnD(s) + lnD(t+ σ) ≤ lnD(s+ σ) + lnD(t) (6)
for every σ > 0 and s, t ∈ T with s > t ≥ 0. Inequality (6) is equivalent to convexity of
lnD(t).
2There is an inconsistency between Jackson and Yariv’s Present Bias definition in their 2014 paper
(referenced here) and their 2015 paper [12]. We adhere to the former definition.
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The second part is proved analogously. Under a discounted utility representation the
second condition is equivalent to the following: for every s, t ∈ T with s > t ≥ 0 and
every σ > 0 there exist x∗ and y∗ such that:
u(x∗)D(t+ σ) < u(y∗)D(s+ σ) but u(x∗)D(t) > u(y∗)D(s).
Equivalently,
D(s)
D(t)
u(y∗) < u(x∗) <
D(s+ σ)
D(t+ σ)
u(y∗).
From the fact that (y∗, s+σ) is preferred to (x∗, t+σ) with s > t we deduce that u(y∗) > 0.
Hence,
D(s)
D(t)
<
D(s+ σ)
D(t+ σ)
.
This inequality is equivalent to:
lnD(s) + lnD(t+ σ) < lnD(s+ σ) + lnD(t) (7)
for every s, t ∈ T with s > t ≥ 0 and every σ > 0. Inequality (7) holds if and only if
lnD(t) is strictly convex.
Proposition 5 implies that when a discounted utility representation exists the first
condition of Definition 2 follows from the second one, since strict convexity of lnD(t)
implies convexity of lnD(t). An immediate consequence is that present bias is equivalent
to strictly DI, as stated below:
Corollary 6. Suppose the preference order < admits a discounted utility representation.
Then it exhibits present bias if and only if < exhibits strictly DI.
3 Comparative DI
3.1 More DI and log-convexity
Assume now that there are two decision makers and they are both decreasingly im-
patient. What does it mean to say that one of them is more decreasingly impatient than
the other? The answer to this question is in the following definition:3
Definition 3 (cf. [19], Definition 2; [4], Definition 1). We say that <1 exhibits [strictly]
more DI than <2, if for every σ > 0, every ρ, every s, t ∈ T with 0 ≤ t < s and
every x, x′, y, y′ ∈ X with y > x > 0 and y′ > x′ > 0, the conditions (x′, t) ∼2 (y′, s),
(x′, t+ σ) ∼2 (y′, s+ σ + ρ) and (x, t) ∼1 (y, s) imply (x, t+ σ) 41 [≺1] (y, s+ σ + ρ).
Not surprisingly, the (strictly) more DI relation may be expressed in terms of the
comparative convexity of the logarithms of the respective discount functions, for cases in
which both preference relations have discounted utility representations.
3Since the sign of ρ is not restricted in Definition 3, it actually applies to preferences that exhibit
decreasing or increasing impatience.
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Proposition 7 (cf. [19], Proposition 1). Let <1 and <2 be two preference orders with
discounted utility representation by (u1, D1) and (u2, D2), respectively. The following con-
ditions are equivalent:
(i) The preference order <1 exhibits (strictly) more DI than <2;
(ii) lnD1(D
−1
2 (e
z)) is (strictly) convex in z on (−∞, 0].
Proof. See the Appendix. We follow Prelec’s argument for his Proposition 1 in [19]. The
additional adjustment is the necessity to replace convexity of the log-transformed discount
function with strict convexity for the strictly more DI case. The required adjustments are
not substantial but we have included a detailed proof as it clarifies some details omitted
from Prelec’s original version [19].
Note that the form of the utility functions u1 and u2 does not influence the comparative
DI properties of preference relations.
Corollary 8. Let <1 and <2 be two preference relations with discounted utility represen-
tations (u1, D1) and (u2, D2), respectively, where D2(t) = δ
t and δ ∈ (0, 1). The preference
order <1 exhibits (strictly) DI if and only if it exhibits (strictly) more DI than <2.
Proof. Prelec [19] proves that a preference relation is DI if and only if it is more DI than
an exponential discount function. We prove the “strict” part of the claim.
Since D2(t) = δ
t and δ ∈ (0, 1) we have
D−12 (e
z) =
z
ln δ
≥ 0.
By Proposition 7, for <1 to exhibit strictly more DI than <2 it is necessary and sufficient
that lnD1(D
−1
2 (e
z)) is strictly convex in z on (−∞, 0]. However,
lnD1(D
−1
2 (e
z)) = lnD1
( z
ln δ
)
= lnD1(t),
where
t =
z
ln δ
∈ [0,∞)
when z takes arbitrary values in (−∞, 0]. Therefore, strict convexity of lnD1(D−12 (ez))
in z on (−∞, 0] is equivalent to strict convexity of lnD1(t) in t on [0,∞). By Proposition
4, strict convexity of lnD1(t) in t on [0,∞) is equivalent to <1 exhibiting strictly DI.
The following notations will be used below:
• If D1 and D2 represent equally DI preferences, we write D1 ∼DI D2;
• If D1 represents more DI preferences than D2, we write D1 <DI D2;
• If D1 represents strictly more DI preferences than D2, we write D1 DI D2.
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The following corollary, due to Prelec [19], characterizes the relation between any two
discount functions from the same DI class.
Corollary 9 ([19]). For any two discount functions D1 and D2, we have D1 ∼DI D2 if
and only if D1(t) = D2(t)
c, where c > 0 is a constant not depending on t.
The <DI relation is a partial order. In fact, the “more DI” and “strictly more DI”
relations are both transitive This is established in the following proposition.
Proposition 10. If D1 <DI D2 and D2 <DI D3, then D1 <DI D3. If at least one of the
relations D1 <DI D2 or D2 <DI D3 is strict, then D1 DI D3.
Proof. Suppose D1 <DI D2 and D2 <DI D3. By Proposition 7, we know that both
lnD1(D
−1
2 (e
z)) and lnD2(D
−1
3 (e
z)) are convex in z on (−∞, 0]. Defining hi = lnDi for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we can equivalently state that h1 ◦ h−12 and h2 ◦ h−13 are convex on (−∞, 0].
To prove transitivity it is sufficient to show that lnD1(D
−1
3 (e
z)) is convex in z on (−∞, 0],
or equivalently that h1 ◦ h−13 is convex on (−∞, 0].
Let f1 = h1 ◦ h−12 and f2 = h2 ◦ h−13 . Then
lnD1
(
D−13 (e
z)
)
= h1
(
h−13 (z)
)
= h1h
−1
2
(
h2h
−1
3 (z)
)
= f1 ◦ f2(z) = f(z).
By the assumption, f1 and f2 are convex functions. Note that f1 is increasing, as the
composition of two decreasing functions h1 and h
−1
2 . Indeed, h1 = lnD1 is a strictly
decreasing function as D1 is strictly decreasing, and h
−1
2 is a decreasing function as the
inverse of the decreasing function h2. Lemma 1 then implies that f(z) = f1 ◦ f2(z) =
lnD1
(
D−12 (e
z)
)
is convex, and that f is strictly convex if fi is strictly convex for some
i ∈ {1, 2}.
3.2 Time Preference Rate and Index of DI
In this section we assume that D is twice continuously differentiable. The rate of time
preference, r(t), is defined as follows:
r(t) = −D
′(t)
D(t)
.
The following lemma relates the DI property to the behaviour of r(t).4
Lemma 11. Let < be a preference relation with DU representation (u,D) in which D is
twice continuously differentiable. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The preference relation exhibits (strictly) DI;
4Takeuchi [26] contains a related result. His Corollary 1 says that the hazard function is decreasing
(increasing) if and only if preferences exhibit decreasing (increasing) impatience. Takeuchi’s hazard
function h(t) corresponds to our time preference rate r(t). However, Takeuchi does not analyse the case
of strictly decreasing impatience.
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(ii) The time preference rate r(t) is (strictly) decreasing on [0,∞).
Proof. Suppose that r(t) is decreasing on [0,∞). This is equivalent to
r′(t) = −D
′′(t)D(t)− (D′(t))2
D(t)2)
=
(D′(t))2 −D′′(t)D(t)
D(t)2
≤ 0.
Or, alternatively, D′′D − (D′)2 ≥ 0. This inequality is equivalent to log-convexity of D,
which, by Proposition 4, means that the preference order exhibits DI.
To prove the equivalence of strictly DI preferences and a strictly decreasing rate of
time preference, recall that a continuously differentiable function r : R+ → R is strictly
decreasing if and only if r′(t) ≤ 0 for all t and the set { t r′(t) = 0 } contains no non-
trivial interval [25, 23]. If a function v is differentiable on an open interval I ⊂ R, then v
is strictly convex on I if and only if v′ is strictly increasing on I [23]. Assume that r(t) is
strictly decreasing on [0,∞). Let M ⊆ R+ be the set of t values such that r′(t) < 0. Then
D′′(t)D(t) − [D′(t)]2 > 0 for all t ∈ M . Since R+ \M contains no non-trivial interval,
r′(t) being strictly decreasing is equivalent to D being strictly log-convex.
One way to measure the level of DI for suitably differentiable discount functions was
suggested by Prelec [19]. Since more DI preferences have discount functions which are
more log-convex, the natural criterion would be some measure of convexity of the log of
the discount function. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient, which is a measure of the concavity
of a function, can be adapted to this purpose. Indeed, a non-increasing rate of time
preference, r′(t) ≤ 0, is precisely analogous to the notion of decreasing risk aversion in
Pratt [18].
Recall that D is a twice continuously differentiable function. The associated rate of
impatience, IR(D), is defined as follows:
IR(D) = −D
′′
D′
.
The index of DI of D, denoted IDI(D), is the difference between the rate of impatience
and the rate of time preference:
IDI(D) = IR(D)− r(D) =
(
−D
′′
D′
)
−
(
−D
′
D
)
.
Note that
IDI(D)(t) = −r
′(t)
r(t)
= − d
dt
ln [r(t)] . (8)
Prelec [19] proved that if <1 and <2 both have DU representations with twice continuously
differentiable discount functions, D1 and D2 respectively, then <1 exhibits more DI than
<2 if and only if IDI(D1) ≥ IDI(D2) on the interval [0,∞). The following proposition
strengthens this result.
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Proposition 12. Let <1 and <2 have DU representations with discount functions D1
and D2, respectively, where D1 and D2 are twice continuously differentiable. Then the
preference order <1 exhibits strictly more DI than <2 if and only if IDI(D1) ≥ IDI(D2)
on the interval [0,∞) and { t | IDI(D1)(t) = IDI(D2)(t) } contains no non-trivial interval.
Proof. Prelec’s [19, Proposition 2] proof applies the Arrow-Pratt coefficient [18], which
is used to compare the concavity of functions. There is no straightforward adaptation of
Prelec’s argument to the case of strict concavity. We therefore adapt Pratt’s [18] original
argument directly.
Recall that D1 is strictly more DI than D2 if and only if ln(D1) is strictly more
convex than ln(D2) on [0,∞). Let h1 = ln(D1) and h2 = ln(D2), so h1 and h2 are
strictly decreasing functions. The function h1 is strictly more convex than h2 on (−∞, 0]
if and only if there exists a strictly convex transformation f such that h1 = f(h2), or,
equivalently, h1
(
h−12 (z)
)
is strictly convex on (−∞, 0].
The first derivative of h1
(
h−12 (z)
)
is:
dh1
(
h−12 (z)
)
dz
=
h′1
(
h−12 (z)
)
h′2
(
h−12 (z)
) . (9)
We need to show that expression (9) is strictly increasing. Note that h−12 (z) is strictly
decreasing since h2 is strictly decreasing. Therefore, (9) is strictly increasing if and only
if h′1(x)upslopeh′2(x) is strictly decreasing. The latter is satisfied if and only if
log
[
h′1(x)
h′2(x)
]
(10)
strictly decreases (since log(x) is strictly increasing). The first derivative of (10) is:
h′2(x)
h′1(x)
· h
′′
1(x)h
′
2(x)− h′1(x)h′′2(x)
[h′2(x)]2
=
h′′1(x)
h′1(x)
− h
′′
2(x)
h′2(x)
Therefore (10) is strictly decreasing if and only if
h′′1(x)
h′1(x)
− h
′′
2(x)
h′2(x)
≤ 0
and the set {
x
∣∣∣∣ h′′1(x)h′1(x) − h
′′
2(x)
h′2(x)
= 0
}
contains no non-trivial interval.
Note that:
h′′i
h′i
=
D′′i
D′i
− D
′
i
Di
.
Therefore,
h′′1(x)
h′1(x)
− h
′′
2(x)
h′2(x)
≤ 0
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is equivalent to
−D
′′
1
D′1
−
(
−D
′
1
D1
)
≥ −D
′′
2
D′2
−
(
−D
′
2
D2
)
.
This means that D1 DI D2 if and only if IDI(D1) ≥ IDI(D2) on [0,∞), and
{ t | IDI(D1)(t) = IDI(D2)(t) } contains no non-trivial interval.
From Proposition 12, Lemma 11 and (8) it follows that< is DI if and only if IDI(D) ≥ 0
on [0,∞), and < is strictly DI if and only if IDI(D) ≥ 0 on [0,∞) and { t | IDI(D)(t) = 0 }
contains no non-trivial interval. Note that the index of DI equals zero for an exponential
discount function.5
The following example illustrates the index of DI for a generalized hyperbolic discount
function. We will make use of this information later.
Example 1. The function D(t) = (1 + ht)−α/h, with h > 0 and α > 0, is called the
generalized hyperbolic discount function. For this function we have:
r(t) = α(1 + ht)−1 and IR(D)(t) = (α + h)(1 + ht)−1.
Therefore, IDI(D)(t) = h(1 + ht)
−1. If D1(t) = (1 + h1t)−α/h1 and D2(t) = (1 + h2t)−α/h2
are two generalized hyperbolic discount functions then D1 <DI [DI ] D2, if and only if
h1 ≥ [>] h2.
Thus the parameter h may be used as a measure of the degree of DI of a generalized
hyperbolic discount function, while the parameter α has no influence on IDI(D). We call
parameter h the hyperbolic discount rate. The special case of a generalized hyperbolic
discount function with α = h > 0 is called the proportional hyperbolic discount function.
4 Mixtures of Discount Functions
As described in the introduction, there are some situations in which the necessity
arises to calculate a convex combination (mixture) of discount functions.
4.1 Two scenarios
The first situation where a convex combination of discount functions may be used is
when there is a group of decision makers with different discount functions and a social
discount function needs to be constructed. The natural option is averaging the discount
functions among individuals, which is equivalent to averaging the discounted utilities
when all agents have identical utility functions. This approach has been widely used in
the existing literature on time preferences ([11]).
Indeed, suppose that we have a set of agents M = {1, . . . ,m}. Assume that agent
i has time preferences with DU representation (u,Di). Thus, all agents have the same
5Similarly, < is II if and only if IDI(D) ≤ 0 on [0,∞) and strictly II if and only if IDI(D) ≤ 0 on
[0,∞) and { t | IDI(D)(t) = 0 } contains no non-trivial interval.
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instantaneous utility function. Then we define the collective (utilitarian) utility function
as uˆ(x) = mu(x) and the collective total utility at time t is
Uˆ(x, t) =
m∑
i=1
Di(t)u(x) =
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
Di(t)
)
uˆ(x).
Thus, we obtain the collective discount function D = 1
m
∑m
i=1Di.
In the second possible scenario, discussed by Sozou [24] and Weitzman [27], there is a
single decision maker with some uncertainty about her discount function. For example,
there may be some possibility of not surviving to any given period, t, described by a
survival function with and uncertain (constant) hazard rate [24]. Then the expected
discount function of this decision maker can be calculated as a weighted average of the
distinct discount functions that may eventuate.
If the discount function Di eventuates with probability pi, then the expected utility
of the decision maker is
Uˆ(x, t) =
m∑
i=1
piDi(t)u(x) =
(
m∑
i=1
piDi(t)
)
u(x).
and the certainty equivalent discount function will be D =
∑m
i=1 piDi.
The same question arises in both cases: Is it possible to make some conclusion about
the behaviour of the convex combination of distinct discount functions in comparison with
its components, if all the component discount functions exhibit DI?
4.2 Mixtures of discount functions with decreasing impatience
Given a set of discount functions {D1, D2, . . . , Dn}, we define a mixture of them as
D =
n∑
i=1
λiDi,
where 0 < λi < 1 for all i and
∑n
i=1 λi = 1. Note that we define a mixture such that each
Di has a strictly positive weight.
We first discuss some known results related to the mixture of discount functions.
One of the most recent results was obtained by Jackson and Yariv [11], who demon-
strated that if all decision makers in a group have exponential discount functions, but
they do not all have the same discount factor, then their collective discount function must
be present biased.
It has also been noted by several authors (for example, [20] and [22]), that time prefer-
ences have strong similarities with risk preferences and that some results from risk theory
are relevant in the context of intertemporal choice. Pratt [18] showed that decreasing
risk aversion is preserved under linear combinations. As was observed in Section 3.2,
decreasing risk aversion is analogous to non-decreasing time preference rate, or DI of the
discount function. Therefore, Pratt’s result can be translated into our time preference
framework as follows:
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Proposition 13 (cf. [18], Theorem 5). Let <1,<2, . . . ,<n have DU representations with
twice continuously differentiable discount functions D1, . . . , Dn, respectively. Assume that
<1,<2, . . . ,<n all exhibit DI. Let
D =
n∑
i=1
λiDi,
be a mixture of D1, . . . , Dn. Then D is DI. It is strictly DI if and only if
{ t | r1(t) = r2(t) = . . . = rn(t) and r′1(t) = r′2(t) = . . . = r′n(t) = 0 }
contains no non-trivial interval.
Proof. From the definition of time preference rate it follows that D′i = −riDi for all
i = 1, . . . , n. The time preference rate for D is:
r = −D
′
D
= −
∑n
i=1 λiD
′
i
D
=
n∑
i=1
λiDi
D
ri.
By Lemma 11, to prove that D exhibits DI we must show that r′(t) ≤ 0:
r′ =
n∑
j=1
λjD
′
j
∑n
i=1 λiDi − λjDj
∑n
i=1 λiD
′
i
D2
rj +
n∑
j=1
λjDj
D
r′j.
Rearranging and substituting D′i = −riDi we obtain:
r′ =
n∑
j=1
λjDj
D
r′j +
Q
D2
,
where
Q = −
n∑
j=1
[
λjrjDj
n∑
i=1
λiDi − λjDj
n∑
i=1
λiriDi
]
rj
This is a quadratic form in D1, D2, . . . , Dn with the coefficient on DiDj being
λiλj
(
rirj − r2j
)
+ λiλj
(
rirj − r2i
)
= −λ1λ2(ri − rj)2.
Hence
Q = −
∑
i<j
λiλjDiDj(ri − rj)2.
Since Di ∈ (0, 1], λi > 0 and r′i ≤ 0 for all i = 1, . . . n, we have r′(t) ≤ 0. Therefore, < is
DI. The preference relation < is strictly DI if and only if r′(t) is strictly decreasing. We
see that r′(t) is strictly decreasing iff
{ t | r1(t) = r2(t) = . . . = rn(t) and r′1(t) = r′2(t) = . . . = r′n(t) = 0 }
contains no non-trivial interval.
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The following corollary describes an important special case of Proposition 13:
Corollary 14. Mixtures of non-identical exponential discount functions are strictly DI.
Corollary 14 is therefore a continuous-time version of Jackson and Yariv (2014, Propo-
sition 1). Prelec [19, Corollary 4] considers the mixture of two discount functions only, but
does not require differentiability. He proves that the mixture of two equally DI discount
functions is more DI than its components. Prelec [19, Corollary 4] implies the special case
of Jackson and Yariv’s [11] result when n = 2.
Our objective is to establish such a result which is more general than both Prelec [19]
and Jackson and Yariv [11]. The result we obtain is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Let n ≥ 2 and D1, . . . , Dn be distinct discount functions such that
D1 <DI D2 <DI . . . <DI Dn.
If D is a mixture of D1, . . . , Dn, then D DI Dn.
To construct the proof of this theorem, two preliminary results will be useful. The
first is a strengtheneing of a result in Prelec [19].
Proposition 15. Let λ ∈ (0, 1). If two distinct discount functions D1 and D2 satisfy
D1 ∼DI D2, then their mixture, D = λD1 + (1 − λ)D2, represents strictly more DI
preferences than each Di. That is, D DI D1 and D DI D2.
Proof. As D1 ∼DI D2, then, by Corollary 9, D1(t) = D2(t)c, where c 6= 1, c > 0. By
Proposition 7, it is necessary to demonstrate strict convexity of f(z) = lnD
(
D−11 (e
z)
)
for z ≤ 0. By Proposition 10 it is also sufficient. We note that:
f(z) = lnD
(
D−11 (e
z)
)
= ln
(
λD1
(
D−11 (e
z)
)
+ (1− λ)D2
(
D−11 (e
z)
))
= ln
(
λez + (1− λ)ez/c) .
The first-order derivative of f(z) is:
f ′(z) =
λez + 1
c
(1− λ)ez/c
λez + (1− λ)ez/c .
The second-order derivative is:
f ′′(z) =
(
λez + 1
c2
(1− λ)ez/c) (λez + (1− λ)ez/c)− (λez + 1
c
(1− λ)ez/c)2
(λez + (1− λ)ez/c)2 =
p(z)
q(z)
.
Both the denominator q(z) and the numerator p(z) of this fraction are strictly positive.
The former is obvious. To see the latter, note that the numerator p(z) can be simplified
as follows:
p(z) =
(
λez +
1
c2
(1− λ)ez/c
)(
λez + (1− λ)ez/c)− (λez + 1
c
(1− λ)ez/c
)2
= λ(1− λ)e(1+ 1c)z − 2
c
λ(1− λ)e(1+ 1c)z + 1
c2
λ(1− λ)e(1+ 1c)z
= e(1+
1
c)zλ(1− λ)
(
1− 1
c
)2
.
Therefore, f is a strictly convex function.
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Proposition 15 is a stronger version of Corollary 4 in [19], as we show that the mixture
of two discount functions that are equally DI represents strictly more DI preferences,
rather than just more DI preferences. It is important to note that Proposition 15 cannot
be directly generalized to n discount functions by induction. To obtain the path to such
generalization, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 16. Let λ ∈ (0, 1). If two distinct discount functions D1 and D2 satisfy D1 <DI
D2, then their mixture D = λD1 + (1−λ)D2 represents strictly more DI preferences than
D2. That is, D DI D2.
Proof. If D1 ∼DI D2 then the conclusion follows from Proposition 15. Suppose that D1
represents strictly more DI preferences than D2. Then, by Proposition 7, lnD1
(
D−12 (e
z)
)
is strictly convex on (∞, 0]. We need to demonstrate that lnD (D−12 (ez)) is also strictly
convex on (∞, 0], or, equivalently, that the following function is strictly log-convex:
D
(
D−12 (e
z)
)
= λD1D
−1
2 (e
z) + (1− λ)D2D−12 (ez) = λD1D−12 (ez) + (1− λ)ez.
Denote λD1D
−1
2 (e
z) = f and (1− λ)ez = g. Then we have:
D
(
D−12 (e
z)
)
= f + g,
where f is strictly log-convex by assumption and g = (1−λ)ez is log-convex. By Lemma 2,
the sum of a strictly log-convex function and a log-convex function is strictly log-convex,
hence D
(
D−12 (e
z)
)
is strictly log-convex.
We are now ready to provide the proof of Theorem 1, since Lemma 16 can be straight-
forwardly generalized to the case of n distinct discount functions.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove this statement by induction on n. By Lemma 16 the result
holds for n = 2. Suppose that the statement of the theorem is true for n = k. Let
D(k+1) = η1D1 + . . .+ ηk+1Dk+1
where
∑k+1
i=1 ηi = 1 and each ηi ∈ (0, 1). Then
D(k+1) = η1D1 + . . .+ ηk+1Dk+1
= (1− ηk+1)
(
η1
1− ηk+1D1 + . . .+
ηk
1− ηk+1Dk
)
+ ηk+1Dk+1.
Let
D(k) =
η1
1− ηk+1D1 + . . .+
ηk
1− ηk+1Dk.
By the induction hypothesis, D(k) DI Dk. It is also known that Dk <DI Dk+1, and
hence, by Proposition 10, D(k) DI Dk+1. However, the mixture of these two functions is
exactly
D(k+1) = (1− ηk+1)D(k) + ηk+1Dk+1.
Then, by Proposition 16, D(k+1) DI Dk+1, which completes the induction step.
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4.3 Mixtures of twice continuously differentiable
discount functions
Note that when discount functions are suitably differentiable, Theorem 1 and Propo-
sition 12 imply that
IDI(D) ≥ min
i
{IDI(Di)} on [0,∞) (11)
and the set of t values at which equality holds does not include any non-trivial interval.
Consider the following example:
Example 2. Let D1(t) = (1 + ht)
−2 be a zero-speed hyperbolic discount function [13] and
D2(t) = exp(−αt1/2) be a slow Weibull discount function [13]. As shown in Example 1,
IDI(D1)(t) = h(1 + ht)
−1 > 0 for all t. We also have IDI(D2)(t) = (2t)−1 > 0 for all t
since
r2(t) =
α
2
t−1/2 and r′2(t) = −
α2
4
t−3/2.
Therefore, both D1 and D2 exhibit strict DI. Assume that h = 0.1. Then
IDI(D1)(t)− IDI(D2)(t) = 0.1
1 + 0.1t
− 0.51
t
= 0.05
t− 10
1 + 0.1t
.
Obviously, IDI(D1)(t) ≤ IDI(D2)(t) if and only if t ≤ 10 and IDI(D1)(t) > IDI(D2)(t)
if and only if t > 10. It follows that D1 and D2 both are from incomparable DI classes.
Since D1 and D2 both exhibit strictly DI, Proposition 13 implies that their mixture D also
exhibits strictly DI.
Index of DI of D1
Index of DI of D2
Index of DI of Mixture of D1 and D2
Time
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Figure 1: Index of DI for the Mixture of D1 and D2
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By direct calculation we obtain the following expression:
IDI(D)(t) =
6λ1h
2(1 + ht)−4 + 1/4λ2α exp−αt0.5t−1(α + t−0.5)
2λ1h(1 + ht)−3 + 1/2λ2α exp−αt0.5t−0.5
− 2λ1h(1 + ht)
−3 + 1/2λ2α exp−αt0.5t−0.5
λ1(1 + ht)−2 + λ2 exp−αt0.5 .
The behaviour of IDI(D) with parameters λ1 = λ2 = 0.5, h = 0.1 and α = 0.12 is
illustrated in Figure 1. It can be clearly seen from Figure 1 that neither D DI D1 nor
D DI D2. However, IDI(D) ≥ min{IDI(D1), IDI(D2)} on [0,∞).
Example 2 suggests that the inequality (11) may continue to hold even if the discount
functions are not DI-comparable. Theorem 2 verifies this conjecture.
Theorem 2. Let <1,<2, . . . ,<n have DU representations with twice continuously differ-
entiable discount functions D1, D2, . . . , Dn, respectively. Let D =
∑n
i=1 λiDi be a mixture
of D1, D2, . . . , Dn. Then IDI(D) ≥ min
i
{IDI(Di)} on [0,∞), and
IDI(D)(t) > min
i
{IDI(Di)(tˆ)
if rj(tˆ) 6= rk(tˆ) for some j 6= k.
Proof. Let Ii = IDI(Di) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and let I = IDI(D). Recall that D′ = −rD
and hence D′′ = Dr2 −Dr′ = Dr(r + I). Recall also that
I = −D
′′
D′
+
D′
D
.
Therefore,
I =
−∑ni=1 λiD′′i∑n
i=1 λiD
′
i
+
∑n
i=1 λiD
′
i∑n
i=1 λiDi
=
∑n
i=1 λiDiri(ri + Ii)∑n
i=1 λiDiri
−
∑n
i=1 λiDiri∑n
i=1 λiDi
.
This expression can be rearranged as follows:
I =
∑n
i=1 λiDiriIi∑n
i=1 λiDiri
+
∑n
i=1 λiDir
2
i∑n
i=1 λiDiri
−
∑n
i=1 λiDiri∑n
i=1 λiDi
=
n∑
i=1
αi(t)Ii +Q,
where
Q =
∑n
i=1 λiDir
2
i∑n
i=1 λiDiri
−
∑n
i=1 λiDiri∑n
i=1 λiDi
and αi =
λiDiri∑n
i=1 λiDiri
with
∑n
i=1 αi = 1 and αi ≥ 0. Note that
min
i
{Ii} ≤
n∑
i=1
αiIi ≤ max
i
{Ii} for all t ∈ [0,∞).
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The expression Q can be rewritten as:
Q =
[∑n
i=1 λiDir
2
i
]
·
[∑n
i=1 λiDi
]
−
[∑n
i=1 λiDiri
]2[∑n
i=1 λiDiri
]
·
[∑n
i=1 λiDi
] .
The denominator of Q is strictly positive, so the sign of Q depends on the sign of the
numerator. Let N be the numerator of Q:
N =
[ n∑
i=1
λiDir
2
i
]
·
[ n∑
i=1
λiDi
]
−
[ n∑
i=1
λiDiri
]2
.
We can simplify N as follows:
N =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λiλjDiDjr
2
i −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λiλjDiDjrirj.
Therefore, we have:
N =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
θijri (ri − rj)
where θij = λiλjDiDj. Since θij = θji > 0 for all i and j we see that
N =
∑
i<j
θij [ri (ri − rj) + rj (rj − ri)] =
∑
i<j
θij (ri − rj)2 .
Hence, N ≥ 0 and N > 0 if rj 6= rk for some j 6= k. It follows that Q ≥ 0 and Q > 0
if rj 6= rk for some j 6= k. Therefore, since I =
∑n
i=1 αiIi +Q and
min
i
{Ii} ≤
n∑
i=1
αiIi ≤ max
i
{Ii} for all t ∈ [0,∞),
we have:
min
i
{Ii} ≤ min
i
{Ii}+Q ≤
n∑
i=1
αiIi +Q = I.
In other words, I ≥ min
i
{Ii} on [0,∞), and I(tˆ) > min
i
{Ii(tˆ)} if rj(tˆ) 6= rk(tˆ) for some
j 6= k.
Observe that this result does not require discount functions to exhibit decreasing
impatience. Therefore, Theorem 2 makes less restrictive assumptions than Proposition
13 – it allows the discount functions to exhibit increasing impatience.
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4.4 Mixtures of proportional hyperbolic discount functions
Weitzman [27] shows that if different discount functions may eventuate with certain
probabilities, then future costs and benefits must eventually be discounted at the lowest
possible limiting time preference rate. This result is particularly salient when the possible
discount functions are all exponential, with constant time preference rates. The purpose of
this section is to give an analogous result for proportional hyperbolic discount functions,
with constant hyperbolic discount rates (Example 1). The result in this case is very
different to Weitzman’s. Long-term future benefits and costs are discounted, not at the
lowest hyperbolic discount rate, but at the probability-weighted harmonic mean of the
individual hyperbolic discount rates.
Suppose that there is some uncertainty about the rate of time preference, and we
have a set of possible scenarios N = {1, . . . , n} where each time preference rate ri(t) may
eventuate with probability pi ≥ 0, such that
∑n
t=1 pi = 1. Since for each i
ri(t) = −D
′
i(t)
Di(t)
,
the corresponding discount function can be expressed in terms of the rate of time prefer-
ence as follows
Di(t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
ri(τ)dτ
)
for each i ∈ N. (12)
The certainty equivalent discount function will be:
D =
n∑
i=1
piDi, where pi ≥ 0 and
n∑
t=1
pi = 1.
Then the certainty equivalent time preference rate is r = −D′
D
. Weitzman [27] proved
that if each rate of time preference converges to a non-negative value as time goes to
infinity, then the certainty equivalent rate of time preference converges to the lowest of
these values. In other words, if limt→∞ ri(t) = r∗i with r
∗
i ≥ 0 and r∗1 < r∗i , where i 6= 1,
then limt→∞ r(t) = r∗1.
Example 3. Note that ri(t) in (12) is constant if and only if Di is exponential. In this
case we have:
Di(t) = exp (−rit) for each i ∈ N,
where ri = const. Therefore, Weitzman’s result implies that limt→∞ r(t) = mini ri. Figure
2 illustrates for the case n = 3, r1 = 0.01, r2 = 0.02, r3 = 0.03 and p1 = p2 = p3 =
1/3. We also observe that the certainty equivalent rate of time preference r(t) decreases
monotonically towards r1. This is a consequence of Corollaries 8 and 14 and the fact that
IDI(D) = −r′/r.
However, Weitzman’s result [27] does not provide much insight in the special case when
each possible time preference has a DU representation with a proportional hyperbolic
discount function. Suppose
Di(t) =
1
1 + hit
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Figure 2: Mixture of Exponential Discount Functions
for each i ∈ N , where hi > 0 is the hyperbolic discount rate. Without loss of generality
we assume that h1 > h2 > . . . > hn. Suppose that Di eventuates with probability pi
where pi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. Then the certainty equivalent discount function would be
D(t) =
p1
1 + h1t
+ . . .+
pn
1 + hnt
.
The rate of time preference is
ri(t) =
hi
1 + hit
for all i. It is obvious that r∗i = r
∗
j = 0 for all i 6= j and limt→∞ r(t) = 0, which,
indeed, corresponds to Weitzman’s result. However, this conclusion does not give much
information about the asymptotic behavior of the certainty equivalent discount function.
Given that each possible discount function comes from a different DI class (unlike in the
case of heterogeneous exponential discount functions) we would like to know which (if any)
most closely characterizes the asymptotic behaviour of the certain equivalent function.
To answer this question we need to modify the analysis of Weitzman. Note that the
certainty equivalent discount function can be written as
D(t) =
1
1 + h(t)t
,
where h(t) is the certainty equivalent hyperbolic discount rate. In particular,
h(t) = (
1
D(t)
− 1)1
t
,
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so h(t) is well-defined for t ∈ (0,∞). We ask: How does h(t) behave as t→∞?
We remind the reader that the weighted harmonic mean of non-negative values
x1, x2, . . . , xn with non-negative weights a1, a2, . . . , an satisfying a1 + . . .+ an = 1 is
H(x1, a1; . . . ;xn, an) =
(
n∑
i=1
ai
xi
)−1
.
It is well-known that the weighted harmonic mean is smaller than the corresponding
expected value (weighted arithmetic mean).
Theorem 3. Suppose that each Di (i ∈ N) is a proportional hyperbolic discount function,
with associated hyperbolic discount rate hi. Discount function Di will eventuate with proba-
bility pi. Then the long-term certainty equivalent hyperbolic discount rate is the probability-
weighted harmonic mean of the individual hyperbolic discount rates, H(h1, p1; . . . ;hn, pn).
Proof. We note that
pi
1 + hit
=
pi
hit
+ i(t),
where i(t)/t
2 → 0 when t→∞. Let (t) = 1(t) + . . .+ n(t). Hence it follows that:
1
1 + h(t)t
=
n∑
i=1
piDi(t) =
p1
1 + h1t
+ . . .+
pn
1 + hnt
=
p1
h1t
+ . . .+
pn
hnt
+ (t)
=
(
p1
h1
+ . . .+
pn
hn
)
1
t
+ (t)
=
1
H(h1, p1; . . . ;hn, pn)t
+ (t)
=
1
1 +H(h1, p1; . . . ;hn, pn)t
+ ˆ(t),
where ˆ(t)/t2 → 0 as t→∞. This implies that h(t)→ H(h1, p1; . . . ;hn, pn) as t→∞.
Figure 3 illustrates Theorem 3 for the case n = 3, when hyperbolic rates h1 = 0.01,
h2 = 0.02 and h3 = 0.03 eventuate with equal probabilities. Note that h2 = 0.02
corresponds to the arithmetic mean of h1, h2 and h3. Figure 3 displays the conver-
gence of the certainty equivalent hyperbolic discount rate to the weighted harmonic mean
H(h1, p1;h2, p;h3, p3). It also shows the certainty equivalent hyperbolic discount rate de-
creasing monotonically. The following proposition proves that this is always the case.
Proposition 17. Suppose that each Di (i ∈ N) is a proportional hyperbolic discount
function, with associated hyperbolic discount rate hi. Discount function Di will eventu-
ate with probability pi. Then the certainty equivalent hyperbolic discount rate is strictly
decreasing on (0,∞).
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Figure 3: Mixture of Hyperbolic Discount Functions
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on n. First we need to prove that the
statement holds for n = 2. The respective certainty equivalent hyperbolic discount rate
is:
h(t) =
[
1
p1(1 + h1t)−1 + p2(1 + h2t)−1
− 1
]
1
t
for each t > 0. Rearranging:
h(t) =
[
(1 + h1t)(1 + h2t)
p1(1 + h2t) + p2(1 + h1t)
− 1
]
1
t
=
[
1 + (h1 + h2)t+ h1h2t
2
p1 + p2 + (p1h2 + p2h1)t
− 1
]
1
t
.
Since p1 + p2 = 1 we obtain:
h(t) =
[
1 + (h1 + h2) t+ h1h2t
2
1 + (p1h2 + p2h1) t
− 1
]
1
t
=
(h1 + h2 − p1h2 − p2h1) t+ h1h2t2
1 + (p1h2 + p2h1) t
· 1
t
=
h1 + h2 − p1h2 − p2h1 + h1h2t
1 + (p1h2 + p2h1) t
=
p1h1 + p2h2 + h1h2t
1 + (p1h2 + p2h1) t
.
By differentiating h(t):
h′(t) =
h1h2 (1 + (p1h2 + p2h1) t)− (p1h1 + p2h2 + h1h2t) (p1h2 + p2h1)
[1 + (p1h2 + p2h1)t]
2 (13)
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We need to show that h′(t) < 0. Since the denominator of (13) is positive, the sign of
h′(t) depends on the sign of the numerator. Therefore, we denote the numerator of (13)
by Q and analyse it separately:
Q(t) = h1h2 [1 + (p1h2 + p2h1) t]− (p1h1 + p2h2 + h1h2t) (p1h2 + p2h1)
= h1h2 + h1h2(p1h2 + p2h1)t− (p1h1 + p2h2)(p1h2 + p2h1)− h1h2(p1h2 + p2h1)t
= h1h2 − (p1h1 + p2h2) (p1h2 + p2h1) .
By expanding the brackets and using the fact that p1 + p2 = 1 implies 1− p21− p22 = 2p1p2
expression Q can be simplified further:
Q(t) = h1h2 − p21h1h2 − p1p2h21 − p1p2h22 − p22h1h2
= h1h2(1− p21 − p22)− p1p2(h21 + h22)
= 2p1p2h1h2 − p1p2(h21 + h22)
= −p1p2(h1 − h2)2.
Therefore, since h1 6= h2 we have Q < 0. Hence it follows that h′(t) < 0 and h(t) is
strictly decreasing.
Suppose that the proposition holds for n = k. We need to show that it also holds for
n = k + 1. When n = k + 1 the certainty equivalent hyperbolic discount rate is:
hk+1(t) =
[
1
D(k+1)
− 1
]
1
t
,
where
D(k+1) =
k+1∑
i=1
piDi = (1− pk+1)
(
k∑
i=1
pi
1− pk+1Di
)
+ pk+1Dk+1.
Since
k∑
i=1
pi
1− pk+1 = 1,
we have
D(k+1) = (1− pk+1)D(k) + pk+1Dk+1.
where
D(k) =
k∑
i=1
pi
1− pk+1Di.
By the induction hypothesis it follows that
D(k) =
1
1 + hk(t)t
,
where hk is strictly decreasing. Therefore,
h(k+1)(t) =
[
1
(1− pk+1)D(k) + pk+1Dk+1 − 1
]
1
t
=
[
1
(1− pk+1) (1 + hk(t)t)−1 + pk+1 (1 + hk+1t)−1
− 1
]
1
t
.
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Let pˆ1 = 1− pk+1, pˆ2 = pk+1, hˆ1(t) = hk(t) and hˆ2 = hk+1 = const. Then we have
h(k+1)(t) =
[
1
pˆ1(1 + hˆ1(t)t)−1 + pˆ2(1 + hˆ2t)−1
− 1
]
1
t
.
Analogously to the case n = 2, this expression can be rearranged to give:
h(k+1)(t) =
pˆ1hˆ1 + pˆ2hˆ2 + hˆ1hˆ2t
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t+ pˆ2hˆ1t
.
However, by contrast to the case n = 2, hˆ1 is now a function of t. The derivative of h
(k+1)
is:
dh(k+1)(t)
dt
=(
pˆ1hˆ
′
1 + hˆ1hˆ2 + hˆ
′
1hˆ2t
)(
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t+ pˆ2hˆ1t
)
−
(
pˆ1hˆ1 + pˆ2hˆ2 + hˆ1hˆ2t
)(
pˆ1hˆ2 + pˆ2hˆ1 + pˆ2hˆ
′
1t
)
[
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t+ pˆ2hˆ1t
]2 .
The denominator of this fraction is strictly positive, so the sign of the derivative depends
on the numerator only. Denote the numerator by N :
N =
(
pˆ1hˆ
′
1 + hˆ1hˆ2 + hˆ
′
1hˆ2t
)(
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t+ pˆ2hˆ1t
)
−
(
pˆ1hˆ1 + pˆ2hˆ2 + hˆ1hˆ2t
)(
pˆ1hˆ2 + pˆ2hˆ1 + pˆ2hˆ
′
1t
)
.
Note that
N = Qˆ (t) + hˆ′1
[(
pˆ1 + hˆ2t
)(
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t+ pˆ2hˆ1t
)
− pˆ2t
(
pˆ1hˆ1 + pˆ2hˆ2 + hˆ1hˆ2t
)]
,
where Qˆ (t) is defined as in the proof of Proposition 1, but with h1 = hˆ1 (t) and h2 = hˆ2.
Since Proposition 1 establishes that Qˆ (t) ≤ 0 (with equality if and only if hˆ (t) = h2) and
hˆ′1 < 0, it suffices to show that(
pˆ1 + hˆ2t
)(
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t+ pˆ2hˆ1t
)
− pˆ2t
(
pˆ1hˆ1 + pˆ2hˆ2 + hˆ1hˆ2t
)
> 0 (14)
Cancelling terms on the left-hand side of (14) leaves us with:
pˆ1
(
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t
)
+ hˆ2t
(
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t
)
− (pˆ2)2 hˆ2t.
We now use the fact that (pˆ2)
2 = (1− pˆ1)2 = 1− 2pˆ1 + (pˆ1)2 to get
pˆ1
(
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t
)
+ hˆ2t
(
1 + pˆ1hˆ2t
)
− [1− 2pˆ1 + (pˆ1)2] hˆ2t
= pˆ1 +
(
thˆ2
)2
pˆ1 + 2pˆ1hˆ2t,
which is strictly positive as required. Therefore, h(k+1)(t) is strictly decreasing.
25
5 Discussion
We generalized Jackson and Yariv’s result [11] by proving that whenever we aggregate
different discount functions from comparable DI classes, the weighted average function
is always strictly more DI than the least DI of its constituents. This also strengthens
the conclusion of the theorem of Prelec [19] who demonstrates that the mixture of two
different discount functions from the same DI class represents more DI preferences.
When a decision maker is uncertain about her hyperbolic discount rate, we showed
that long-term costs and benefits must be discounted at the probability-weighted harmonic
mean of the hyperbolic discount rates that might eventuate. This complements the well-
known result of Weitzman [27].
One natural question that arises is whether it is possible to prove a result analogous
to Proposition 13 when all preference orders exhibit increasing impatience (II). Will the
mixture of II discount functions be (strictly) II? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer to this
question is negative in general.
This follows from results in the literature on survival analysis and reliability theory.
The similarity between reliability theory and temporal discounting is discussed in [24].
Takeuchi [26] also notes that a discount function is analogous to a survival function, S(t).
The failure rate associated with S(t) is
g(t) = −S
′(t)
S(t)
,
which behaves as a time preference rate. For twice continuously differentiable survival
functions, a decreasing failure rate (DFR) corresponds to a decreasing time preference
rate, and hence to DI, whereas an increasing failure rate (IFR) corresponds to II. Mix-
tures of probability distributions are a common topic in survival and reliability analysis.
Proschan [21] established that mixtures of distributions with DFR always exhibit DFR.6
However, Gurland and Sethuraman [8, 9] provide striking examples of mixtures of very
quickly increasing failure rates that are eventually decreasing.
6 Appendix
6.1 Fishburn and Rubinstein’s axioms for a discounted utility
representation
After Fishburn and Rubinstein [7], we assume that:
Axiom 1. (Weak Order) The preference order < is a weak order, i.e., it is complete
and transitive.
Axiom 2. (Monotonicity) For every x, y ∈ X, if x < y, then (x, t) ≺ (y, t) for every
t ∈ T .
6This result is comparable to the “non-strict” part of our Proposition 13.
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Axiom 3. (Continuity) For every (y, s) ∈ X × T the sets {(x, t) ∈ X × T : (x, t) <
(y, s)} and {(x, t) ∈ X × T : (x, t) 4 (y, s)} are closed.
Axiom 4. (Impatience) For all t, s ∈ T and every x > 0, if t < s, then (x, t)  (x, s).
If t < s and x = 0, then (x, t) ∼ (x, s) for every t, s ∈ T , that is, 0 is a time-neutral
outcome.
Axiom 5. (Separability) For every x, y, z ∈ X and every r, s, t ∈ T if (x, t) ∼ (y, s)
and (y, r) ∼ (z, t) then (x, r) ∼ (z, s).
Fishburn and Rubinstein [7] proved the following result:
Theorem 4 ([7]). The preferences < on X × T satisfy Axioms 1-5 if and only if there
exists a discounted utility representation for < on X × T . If (u,D) and (u0, D0) both
provide discounted utility representations for < on X × T , then u = αu0 for some α > 0,
and D = βD0 for some β > 0.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 7
We need to prove the following lemma first:
Lemma 18. Suppose that h1 and h2 are strictly decreasing functions. Then h1 is a
(strictly) convex transformation of h2 if and only if h2(s)−h2(t) = h2(s+σ+ρ)−h2(t+σ)
implies that h1(s)− h1(t) ≤ [<]h1(s+ σ+ ρ)− h1(t+ σ) for every s. t, σ and ρ satisfying
0 < t < s ≤ t+ σ < s+ σ + ρ.
Proof. We prove necessity first. Suppose that h1 is a (strictly) convex transformation of
h2; that is, there exists a (strictly) convex function f such that h1 = f(h2). Assume also
that 0 < t < s ≤ t+ σ < s+ σ + ρ and
h2(s)− h2(t) = h2(s+ σ + ρ)− h2(t+ σ). (15)
We need to show that
h1(s)− h1(t) ≤ [<] h1(s+ σ + ρ)− h1(t+ σ)
whenever 0 < t < s ≤ t+ σ < s+ σ + ρ. Since h2 is strictly decreasing, it follows that
h2(s+ σ + ρ) < h2(t+ σ) ≤ h2(s) < h2(t).
Recall that f is a (strictly) convex function. Therefore, as equality (15) holds, it implies
that
f(h2(t+ σ))− f(h2(s+ σ + ρ)) ≤ [<] f(h2(t))− f(h2(s)).
Since h1 = f(h2), this inequality is equivalent to
h1(t+ σ)− h1(s+ σ + ρ) ≤ [<] h1(t)− h1(s).
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Rewriting:
h1(s)− h1(t) ≤ [<] h1(s+ σ + ρ)− h1(t+ σ), (16)
whenever 0 < t < s ≤ t+ σ < s+ σ + ρ.
To show the sufficiency, suppose that (15) implies (16) for every s, t, σ and ρ satisfying
0 < t < s ≤ t+ σ < s+ σ + ρ. Define f such that f = h1 ◦ h−12 . Note that we can do so
because h−12 exists (since h2 is a strictly decreasing function). Then if
h2(s+ σ + ρ) < h2(t+ σ) ≤ h2(s) < h2(t)
and equation (15) holds, we have
f(h2(t+ σ))− f(h2(s+ σ + ρ)) ≤ [<] f(h2(t))− f(h2(s)).
Therefore, f is a (strictly) convex function, which means that h1 is a (strictly) convex
transformation of h2.
We can now prove Proposition 7.
Proof. Observe that Di : [0,∞)→ (0, 1] is one-to-one and onto, so D−1i : (0, 1]→ [0,∞).
Let us first prove that condition (i) follows from condition (ii). The proof is by
contraposition. We show that not (i) implies not (ii). Assume that (i) fails; that is, there
exist s and t with 0 < t < s, ρ > 0, σ > 0 and x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X with 0 < x < y and
0 < x′ < y′ such that (x′, t) ∼2 (y′, s), (x′, t+ σ) ∼2 (y′, s+ σ + ρ), (x, t) ∼1 (y, s) and
(x, t+ σ) 1 [<1] (y, s+ σ + ρ).
Since u1(y) > 0 and u2(y
′) > 0 by assumption, this implies
u2(x
′)
u2(y′)
=
D2(s)
D2(t)
=
D2(s+ σ + ρ)
D2(t+ σ)
and
u1(x)
u1(y)
=
D1(s)
D1(t)
> [≥] D1(s+ σ + ρ)
D1(t+ σ)
.
Let h1 = lnD1 and h2 = lnD2. Note that h1 and h2 are both strictly decreas-
ing functions. Observe also that hi : [0,∞) → (−∞, 0] is one-to-one and onto. Thus
h−1i : (−∞, 0] → [0,∞), where h−1i (z) = D−1i (ez). Rewriting these expressions we get
Di(t) = e
hi(t) for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus:
eh2(s)
eh2(t)
=
eh2(s+σ+ρ)
eh2(t+σ)
and
eh1(s)
eh1(t)
> [≥] e
h1(s+σ+ρ)
eh1(t+σ)
.
Equivalently,
h2(s)− h2(t) = h2(s+ ρ+ σ)− h2(t+ σ) (17)
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and
h1(s)− h1(t) > [≥] h1(s+ ρ+ σ)− h1(t+ σ). (18)
Note that lnD1(D
−1
2 (e
z)) (strictly) convex in z on (−∞, 0] is equivalent to h1 ◦ h−12
(strictly) convex in z on (−∞, 0]. In other words, h1 is a (strictly) convex transformation of
h2. By Lemma 18 this conclusion contradicts equation (17) and inequality (18). Therefore,
not (i) implies not (ii).
Secondly, we need to demonstrate that (i) implies (ii). Using the previously introduced
notation, we show that for every for every s, t, σ and ρ satisfying
0 < t < s ≤ t+ σ < s+ σ + ρ
the equation
h2(s)− h2(t) = h2(s+ σ + ρ)− h2(t+ σ)
implies
h1(s)− h1(t) ≤ [<] h1(s+ σ + ρ)− h1(t+ σ).
As h1 and h2 are decreasing functions, this proves that h1 is a (strictly) convex transfor-
mation of h2. Assume that 0 ≤ t < s ≤ t+ σ < s+ σ + ρ such that
h2(s)− h2(t) = h2(s+ σ + ρ)− h2(t+ σ).
By definition of hi = lnDi this expression is equivalent to
D2(s)
D2(t)
=
D2(s+ σ + ρ)
D2(t+ σ)
∈ (0, 1).
As u2 is continuous, we can choose 0 < x
′ < y′ such that:
D2(s)
D2(t)
=
D2(s+ σ + ρ)
D2(t+ σ)
=
u2(x
′)
u2(y′)
.
Therefore, D2(t)u2(x
′) = D2(s)u2(y′) and D2(t + σ)u2(x′) = D2(s + σ + ρ)u2(y′). This
means that (x′, t) ∼2 (y′, s) and (x′, t+ σ) ∼2 (y′, s+ σ + ρ).
Analogously, because u1 is continuous, we can choose x, y such that:
D1(s)
D1(t)
=
u1(x)
u1(y)
∈ (0, 1).
Hence, (x, t) ∼1 (y, s).
But according to (i), if (x′, t) ∼2 (y′, s), (x′, t+σ) ∼2 (y′, s+σ+ρ) and (x, t) ∼1 (y, s)
then (x, t+ σ) 41 [≺1] (y, s+ σ + ρ). The latter is equivalent to:
D1(s+ σ + ρ)
D1(t+ σ)
≥ [>] u1(x)
u1(y)
.
It follows that
D1(s)
D1(t)
≤ [<] D1(s+ σ + ρ)
D1(t+ σ)
,
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which is equivalent to
lnD1(s)− lnD1(t) ≤ [<] lnD1(s+ σ + ρ)− lnD1(t+ σ)
or
h1(s)− h1(t) ≤ [<] h1(s+ σ + ρ)− h1(t+ σ).
Therefore,
h2(s)− h2(t) = h2(s+ σ + ρ)− h2(t+ σ)
implies
h1(s)− h1(t) ≤ [<] h1(s+ σ + ρ)− h1(t+ σ)
whenever 0 ≤ t < s ≤ t + σ < s + σ + ρ. Hence, by Lemma 18, h1 is a (strictly) convex
transformation of h2.
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